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American corporate law contains a seemingly innocuous mandate.
Corporations must maintain appropriate books and records, including a stock
ledger with the corporation's shareholders and stock ownership. The importance
of accurate stock ownership records is obvious. Corporations must know who
owns each of its outstanding shares at any point in time. Among other things, this
allows corporations to determine who receives dividends and who is entitled to
vote. In theory, keeping accurate records of stock ownership should be a simple
matter. But despite diligent efforts, serious share discrepancies plague
corporations, and reconciliation is often functionally impossible. Doing so may
require the examination of records from millions of trades, including records
from hundreds of participant brokers and custodial banks (not to mention
records from their individual clients). So, when disputes arise, there is frequently
no easy answer.
This Article charts the use of blockchain technology as a potential solution to the
systemic issues hindering efforts to maintain accurate records of stock transactions.
In doing so, this Article accomplishes three goals. First, it establishes that federal
efforts to resolve the "paperwork crisis" of the 1970's created a concomitant
problem the lack of reliable records of stock ownership, which now threatens the
exercise of shareholder rights. Second, it demonstrates that practical constraints,
not legal barriers, stand as the most significant impediment to the
application of blockchain technology to corporate recordkeeping and global
capital markets. Third, it argues that despite reasons for skepticism, states should
proactively amend corporate codes to authorize the use of blockchain technology
because it enables corporate choice and facilitates efforts by private actors to
assess the viability of innovative solutions. This Article concludes by drawing
transferable lessons to improve law and policy as new applications of
blockchain technology continue to emerge.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professors Ronald J. Mann, Xuan-Thao Nguyen and Kristin
Johnson along with attendees of the Tsai Center for Law, Science and Innovation Spring Panel
at the Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
It is not unreasonable to expect that at any moment in time, a corporation should
know who owns each share of the corporation's outstanding stock. But due to system
constraints, corporations simply cannot make a real-time determination of something
as fundamental as stock ownership.1 Moreover, when disputes arise, no reliable
means of reconciliation may exist.2
Consider the Dole Food Company, Inc. ("Dole")-one of the largest fruit and
vegetable producers in the world. 3 Despite diligent efforts, Dole recently
encountered a share discrepancy of over 12.3 million shares.4 In an opinion for the
Delaware Chancery Court, Vice Chancellor Laster dubbed the discrepancy
"functionally impossible" to resolve and took note of the "insuperable difficulties"
facing those who attempted to do so.5 Vice Chancellor Laster opined further that the
"resulting process would be lengthy, arduous, cumbersome, expensive, and
fundamentally uncertain."6 In short, no one could establish the owners of Dole stock
at the time in question.
1. See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litigation, No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL
624843, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Geoffrey Mohan, Dole, The World's Largest Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Company, Is
Stepping Back from Southland, L.A. TIMEs (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.latimes.com
/business/la-fi-dole-socal-20170830-story.html [https://perma.cc/HP7F-UT6Y].





Uncertain stock ownership records create far-reaching ramifications. Imagine that
a corporation intends to issue a dividend or give legally required notices.7 Suppose
the corporation must hold a vote on a significant matter like election of directors or
a potential merger.9 What if the corporation settles class action stockholder litigation
and needs to identify the members of the class for purposes of issuing payment?"
Each of the foregoing demands an accurate record of the corporation's shareholders
and a verifiable record of each transaction involving the corporation's stock. In short,
there must be confidence in the corporation's records of stock ownership.
If corporations have an incentive to maintain accurate records, what is the
problem? How is it possible that major discrepancies occur? More importantly, why
do corporations and the judiciary lack the tools to efficiently reconcile such a
discrepancy?
Much of the problem stems from the system that arose from the Wall Street
"paperwork crisis" of the 1960s and 1970s.11 The growth of capital markets and
increased stock trading made continuation of the paper-based system of
buying/selling stock impracticable. 12 Clerks simply could not keep up with the
required paperwork.13
The federal solution was a policy of share immobilization." The new policy
ushered in an indirect holding system with electronic book entries and the addition
of one or more tiers of intermediaries (e.g., participant brokers and custodial banks)
between the corporation issuing the share and the investor. 15 As a result, the modern
corporation often does not have a stock ledger that lists the investor's name. 16
Instead, the corporation's stock ledger reflects an intermediary as a registered holder
7. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 213(a), 222(a) (2020).
8. See generally id. §§ 211(b), 219, 223(c).
9. Id. § 251(c).
10. See Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *4.
11. See id. at *4 n.1. See generally Carl S. Bjerre, Investment Securities, 71 Bus. LAW.
1311, 1320-21 (2016) (discussing the "paperwork crisis" and rise of the current indirect
holding system); David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S.
Proxy System andIts Solution, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 41, 50 (2011) (describing the "paperwork
crisis," which was also referred to as a paperwork crunch or paperwork blizzard).
12. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Jul. 13, 2015); Bjerre, supra note 11, at 1320-21.
13. See Donald, supra note 11, at 50.
14. See Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1; Dell, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3-7.
15. See David Brooks, Comment, Depository Trust Company and the Omnibus Proxy:
Shareholder Voting in the Era of Share Immobilization, 56 S. TEx. L. REv. 205, 210-11
(2014); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Modelfor Transfer and Pledge
of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOzO L. REv. 305, 317 n.23
(1990).
16. Brooks, supra note 15, at 210-11; see also Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp.
2d 723, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2010); J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules
and the Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?,
13 J. CORP. L. 683, 722 (1988); Russell A. Hakes, UCCArticle 8: Will the Indirect Holding of
Securities Survive the Light of Day?, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 661, 711 (2002) (discussing the
process of netting); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen 's Jurisprudence and the Theory of
Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 716 (1992).
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(or record holder) who is not the ultimate investor (or beneficial owner). This
bifurcation means that there is no single comprehensive record of ownership. Rather,
reconciling share ownership may require examination of records maintained by
hundreds of intermediaries and their clients. 17
The current system effectively solved the "paperwork crisis" by making the
settlement of transactions more efficient through the use of a central depository and
bookkeeping entries. However, the layers of complexity have made it more difficult
(if not functionally impossible) to obtain a real-time, auditable record of stock
ownership-resulting in a new set of problems, including impairment of shareholder
rights.18
Technological advances such as blockchain technology 19 may provide a
solution. 20 Known as the technology underlying cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin,
blockchain is simply a particular type of digital ledger for recorded transactions.21
As such, it has many other applications.22 In the context of corporate recordkeeping,
17. See Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *1.
18. Id. at *4 n.1; see also John C. Kelly & Maximilian J. Mescall, Taking Stock of the
Block: Blockchain, Corporate Stock Ledgers, and Delaware General Corporation Law Part
II, 1 J. ROBOTICS, A.I. & L. 235, 237 (2018) (noting that intermediaries increase the risk of
intervening causes derailing shareholder ights).
19. The terminology surrounding blockchain technology is unsettled and suffers from
lack of consensus as to meaning. As uch, terms are often used interchangeably. These terms
include blockchain technology, the blockchain, blockchain, distributed ledger technology,
shared ledger technology, consensus ledger technology, decentralized database, and
distributed database. See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law),
36 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 713 (2017) (discussing the unsettled vocabulary and contested
terms surrounding blockchain technology).
20. See Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1; see also Matthew J. O'Toole & Michael K.
Reilly, The First Block in the Chain: Proposed Amendments to the DGCL Pave the Way for
Distributed Ledgers and Beyond, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/the-first-block-in-the-chain-proposed
-amendments-to-the-dgcl-pave-the-way-for-distributed-ledgers-and-beyond/ [https://perma.
cc/KT3U-NZFM]; Marco A. Santori, Governor Jack Markell Announces Delaware
Blockchain Initiative, GLOBAL DEL. BLOG (Jun. 10, 2016),
http://global.blogs.delaware.gov/2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-distributed-ledger-based-
share-ownershipstructure-as-part-of-blockchain-initiative/ [http://perma.cc/BRG9-4YFU].
21. See Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. Bus.
REv. (Jan. -Feb. 2017 Issue), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/Q34N-2CTP] (noting that Bitcoin is the first application of blockchain
technology); Coindesk, What Can a Blockchain Do?, BLOCKCHAIN 101,
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-can-a-blockchain-do/ [https://perma.cc/66R9
-BYJY] (Mar. 9, 2017) (Cryptocurrencies were the first platform developed using blockchain
technology).
22. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply Chain and
Logistics Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018
/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry
/#7a63834c5fec [https://perma.cc/GD3W-FJ6S]; Guang Chen, Bing Xu, Manli Lu & Nian-
Shing Chen, Exploring Blockchain Technology and its Potential Applications for Education,
5 SMART LEARNING ENV'TS 1 (Jan. 3, 2018), https://slejournal.springeropen.com/track/pdf
/10.1186/s40561-017-0050-x [https://perma.cc/ZC9J-6Q43] (discussing use of blockchain
226 [Vol. 96:223
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blockchain technology could allow corporations to "maintain multiple, current
copies of a single and comprehensive stock ownership ledger."23 In doing so, it has
the potential to maintain the paperless nature of the current system while eliminating
the unintended consequences of indirect holding and bifurcated ownership. Thus,
blockchain has the potential to address many of the systemic problems highlighted
by cases like Dole. It is no surprise then that some states have passed (or at least
considered) amendments to their corporate codes to expressly enable the use of
blockchain-based records by corporations.24
I am by no means the first to observe wide-reaching applications of blockchain,
and its potential impact on existing legal structures.25 I do, however, provide the
first comprehensive survey of impediments to the development and implementation
of blockchain-based innovations in corporate law. I break new ground by: (1)
giving recommendations for policymakers and corporations experimenting with
blockchain solutions and (2) shifting the conversation away from cryptocurrency
towards the legal and policy ramifications of other blockchain applications.26
technology for academic degree management and to support summative evaluation of learning
outcomes); Suveen Angraal, Harlan M. Kmmholz & Wade L. Schulz, Blockchain Technology:
Applications in Healthcare, 10 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY & OUTCOMES 1
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/full/10.1161/CIRCOUTCOMES.117
.003800 [https://perma.cc/PB3Z-X9YD] (discussing the use of blockchain in connection with
healthcare records and managing permissions to access health data); RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 243 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016)
(discussing blockchain based voting systems designed to increase transparency by recording
every vote on the blockchain).
23. Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1.
24. See, e.g., H.R. 2603, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018) (signed by Arizona's
governor on Apr. 3, 2018); S. 838 (Ca. 2018) (approved by California's governor on Sept. 28,
2018); S. 3768, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018); H.R. 101 64th Leg. (Wyo. 2018) (signed by
Wyoming's governor on Mar. 10, 2018); S.B. 136 (Md. 2019) (effective Oct. 1, 2019).
25. See, e.g., Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015)
(discussing blockchain technology and property transactions).
26. Cryptocurrencies remain a hot topic. But as a burgeoning legal and regulatory regime
for cryptocurrency develops, the popular conversation has shifted to the value of
cryptocurrency, its staying power, and the human problems associated with it-like
environmental sustainability. The future is unknown. The consensus view, however, is that the
growing value of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is a byproduct of an unsustainable
speculative bubble. Prominent skeptics include Warren Buffet and Professor Robert J. Shiller.
Buffet has opined that cryptocurrencies will with almost certainty "come to a bad ending."
Professor Shiller has offered a parallel between the rise of Bitcoin and tulip-mania in
seventeenth century Holland when a speculative frenzy caused the price of some tulip bulbs
to exceed the cost of a mansion-predicting that the collapse of Bitcoin was a "good likely
outcome." To a degree, the hyper-focus on cryptocurrencies has overshadowed the potentially
wide-ranging and transformative impact of the technology underlying cryptocurrencies-the
blockchain. No matter the future of cryptocurrency, other applications of blockchain
technology may have a more lasting effect on law and policy. One of the objectives of this
Article is to shift the conversation and raw greater attention to the law and policy implications
of blockchain technology more broadly. See Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV.
505 (2018); Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Mining on Track to Consumer All of the World's
Energy by 2020, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/bitcoin-mining-
20201 227
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This Article unfolds as follows. Part I begins with a description of the important
role of stock ledgers in corporate law and in the exercise of shareholder rights. It then
discusses the evolution of corporate recordkeeping and systemic problems that
currently contribute to the persistence of recordkeeping errors and discrepancies.
Part II briefly examines blockchain technology and its application to the
administration of corporate records and more broadly to global capital markets. It
goes on to survey the benefits and disruptive potential of blockchain records and
stock transactions. The upside of blockchain technology is the potential to simplify
recordkeeping, reunify bifurcated ownership interests, and improve transparency. All
of these contribute to greater certainty in determinations of stock ownership and the
elimination of impediments to the rightful exercise of shareholder rights.
Part III turns to the future of blockchain and American corporate law. I conclude
that overcoming legal barriers to blockchain technology is only a necessary first step.
The primary barriers relate to development and implementation. They include: (1)
questions about security, functionality, and scalability; (2) uncertainty about
widespread adoption; (3) transition issues; (4) first mover disadvantage; (5)
incumbency advantage; and (6) collective action problems. As a result, the removal
of legal obstructions does not guarantee that blockchain will become the new norm.
Even though the triumph of a blockchain system is not assured, I argue that states
should act now to expressly authorize the use of blockchain technology for the
administration of corporate records. Why amend corporate law for a technology that
may fail or fade away? I contend that proactive amendment of American corporate
law is justified because it is consistent with the enabling philosophy of corporate
choice. Giving corporations the freedom to opt into the use of blockchain allows for
experimentation and meaningful assessment of blockchain's viability. It also levels
the playing field by abolishing any unintended statutory advantage that corporate law
currently provides to the incumbent system, which allows the market to determine
the future of blockchain.
To assist policymakers in considering whether and how to accommodate other
new applications of blockchain technology, I end by drawing transferable lessons
track-consume-worlds-energy-2020-744036 [https://perma.cc/JWG4-MRK6]; Chris Mooney
& Steven Mufson, Why the Bitcoin Craze Is Using Up So Much Energy, WASH. POST (Dec.
19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/20 17/12/19/why
-the-bitcoin-craze-is-using-up-so-much-energy/?utm_term=.c5bed71b233c [https://perma.cc
/S2LD-MF6C]; Ben Leubsdorf, Is Bitcoin a Bubble? 96% of Economists Say 'Yes', WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/12/13/is-bitcoin-a-bubble-96-of-
economists-say-yes/ [https://perma.cc/PFE3-VU5B] (51 of 53 economists surveyed agreed
that Bitcoin was experiencing a speculative bubble); Ali Montag, Warren Buffet Explains One
Thing People Still Don't Understand About Bitcoin, CNBC (May 1, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/01/warren-buffett-bitcoin-isnt-an-investment.html
[https://perma.cc/2HDR-VKQL]; Brad Tuttle, Bitcoin Is Likely to 'Totally Collapse and Be
Forgotten,' Nobel Prize-Winning Economist Says, YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitcoin-likely-apos-totally-collapse-145045431. html
[https://perma.cc/BR9B-6DD8]; Lorraine Boissoneault, There Never Was a Real Tulip Fever,
SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Sep. 18, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/there
-never-was-real-tulip-fever-180964915/ [https://perma.cc/5P74-UPJJ]; ANNE GOLDGAR,
TULIPMANIA: MONEY, HONOR, AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE (2007).
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from the examination of blockchain's probable impact on corporate stock
transactions and American corporate law.
I. STOCK LEDGERS AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
Corporations have an obligation to keep and maintain appropriate books and
records.27 Among these records is a stock ledger setting forth the corporation's
shareholders and share ownership.28 The maintenance of a stock ledger is a
seemingly mundane topic. However, having an accurate and up to date record of
share ownership is far from a mere administrative chore. Stock ledgers hold the key
to a shareholder's most significant rights, including the ability to vote on matters at
shareholders meetings29 and the ability to inspect corporate records.30 Errors and
inaccuracies in stock ownership records, therefore, can lead to real problems.31 Even
so, stock ledger errors are far from uncommon.
This Part proceeds by: (1) outlining how corporate law relies on a corporation's
own stock ownership records to provide access to shareholder ights, (2) setting forth
the methods used by corporations to maintain share ownership records, and (3)
examining the question of whether current corporate practices and recordkeeping
tools suffice to ensure accuracy. Ultimately, I show that current recordkeeping
methods suffer from systemic limitations that contribute to the occurrence of stock
ledger errors and discrepancies in share ownership.
A. The Fundamental Role of Stock Ledgers
State corporate codes often include an affirmative obligation to keep and maintain
a stock ledger.32 For example, Section 16.01(c) of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act provides that "a corporation or its agent shall maintain a record of
its shareholders, in a form that permits preparation of a list of the names and
addresses of all shareholders, in alphabetical order by class of shares showing the
number and class of shares held by each."33 However, the clerical nature of this
obligation belies the import of stock ownership records (such as corporate stock
27. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.01 (1984) (AM. BAR Ass'N, revised 2002).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 213, 219 (2017).
30. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02; tit. 8, § 220.
31. See, e.g., Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *4; In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL,
2015 WL 4313206, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 2015); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d
20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016).
32. Even where there is no affirmative obligation to maintain a stock ledger provided for
by statute, courts have held that corporations have an implicit duty to do so. See Rainbow
Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1987) (noting that
the corporation's decision not to maintain a stock ledger cannot frustrate Delaware's
statutorily guaranteed right to examine the corporation's stock ledger and finding that implicit
in that right is an affirmative duty on the part of Delaware corporations to maintain a stock
ledger).
33. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.01(c).
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ledgers and transfer books) in both American corporate law and the exercise of
shareholder ights.
The rights of shareholders to control and manage a corporation are illustrative.
The corporate form largely separates ownership from management because the
business and affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors-not the corporation's shareholders.34 As such, the corporation's
owners (its shareholders) relinquish management o the board of directors.
Shareholders do, however, retain certain limited rights of management and
control. Specifically, shareholders have the right to be present at meetings
(either annual meetings or special meetings called by the board of directors) and
the right to vote on certain fundamental matters. Matters requiring a shareholder
vote include election/removal of directors, 35 charter and bylaw amendments, 36
and approval of significant transactions uch as the sale of all or substantially all
of the corporation's property and assets. 3' Because shareholders have few
other means of influencing the corporation, access to these voting rights is
essential.38 Access, however, hinges in large part on the corporate records of share
ownership.
Consider the relevant stockholder meeting and voting provisions in the Delaware
General Corporation Law ("DGCL"). Corporations must provide written
notice whenever stockholders are required or permitted to take any action at a
meeting.39 In addition, corporations must prepare a complete list of stockholders
entitled to vote at the meeting.4 To ensure that corporations have sufficient time to
accomplish these tasks, the DGCL allows corporations to fix a "record date" for the
determination of stockholders entitled to notice of and to vote at the
meeting.41 Those who are shareholders on the record date are shareholders for
purpose of notice and voting, even if they cease to be shareholders after the
record date and before the vote.4 2 Conversely, those who are not shareholders on
the record date are not entitled to notice and do not have the right to vote, even if
they become shareholders after the record date and before the vote.4 3
But to actually determine who qualifies as a shareholder entitled to notice and
the right to vote, state statutes and corporate charter provisions tell corporations to
rely on their own records of registered shareholders.4 4 For example, section 219(c)
of the
34. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 141 ("The business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors .... ").
35. Id. §§ 211(b), 141(k); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.08.
36. See, e.g., tit. 8, §§ 242(b), 109(a).
37. Id. § 271.
38. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("[The
shareholder vote] is critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some
(directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.").
39. tit. 8, § 222(a).
40. Id. § 219(a).
41. Id. § 213(a) ('[T]he record date shall not be more than 60 nor less than 10 days before
the date of the meeting.").
42. See JAMEs D. COx & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW (3d ed.
2011).
43. See id.
44. See id.; see also Bryan v. Western Pac. Ry., 35 A.2d 909 (Del. Ch. 1944).
230 [Vol. 96:223
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DGCL expressly states that "[t]he stock ledger shall be the only evidence as to who
are the stockholders entitled by this section . .. to vote in person or by proxy at any
meeting of stockholders."45 Thus, the corporation's stock ledger4 6 acts as the key to
the exercise of shareholder voting rights because corporate law presumes that the
person whose name appears in the stock ledger (as the owner of the share) has the
right to vote. Accordingly, the accuracy of the corporation's stock ledger affects the
exercise of important shareholder rights, and any unresolvable errors or
discrepancies can give rise to complications, including shareholder litigation.
Although corporate stock ledgers figure most prominently in the context of
shareholder voting rights, the corporation's records of stock ownership may affect
other shareholder rights. Consider the remedial rights, which arise under both
common law and statute, of shareholders to inspect corporate records.4 7 The right to
inspect is significant because it is the shareholder's primary mechanism for
ascertaining how the directors conduct he affairs of the business.48 It follows then
that the right to inspect stems from the desire to protect the shareholder's ownership
interest.49 Accordingly, the right to inspect is appropriately limited to those who are
shareholders.5
State statutes typically define the term more broadly for the purposes of inspection
rights. As such, they typically include shareholders of record and the beneficial
owners of shares.51 Even so, the corporation's records of share ownership can
influence the exercise of inspection rights. The Delaware Chancery Court has held
that inclusion on a corporation's stock ledger is "prima facie evidence of stock
ownership... , but ... the corporate defendant may rebut that presumption by clear
and convincing evidence." 52 As such, inclusion on a stock ledger does not
conclusively establish shareholder status for purposes of inspection. But the stock
ledger does establish a presumption in favor of shareholder status because the stock
ledger is presumed accurate.3
The corporation's records of stock ownership can also influence the exercise of
appraisal rights by dissenting shareholders. Under state law, dissenting shareholders
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2020).
46. The Delaware General Corporation Law defines the term "stock ledger" as "1 or more
records administered by or on behalf of the corporation in which the names of all of the
corporation's stockholders of record, the address and the number of shares registered in the
name of each such stockholder, and all issuances and transfers of stock of the corporation are
recorded .... " Id.
47. See tit. 8 at § 220; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 3d ed., 2003);
COx & HAZEN, supra note 42, § 13.2.
48. See COx & HAZEN, supra note 42, § 13.2.
49. See id.
50. See tit. 8, § 220; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02.
51. See tit. 8, § 220; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.02.
52. Pogue v. Hybrid Energy, No. 11563-VCG, 2016 WL 4154253, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug.
5, 2016); see also Holtzman v. Gruen Holding Corp., No. 13500, 1994 WL 444756 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 5, 1994).
53. See Testa v. Jarvis, No. 12847, 1994 WL 30517, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1994)
("Where the company's ledgers show record ownership, no other evidence of shareholder
status is necessary."); John W. Noble, Fixing Lawyers' Mistakes: The Court's Role in
Administering Delaware's Corporate Statute, 18U. PA. J. Bus. L. 293, 313 (2016).
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who do not vote in favor of a merger may have the right to an appraisal of the fair
value of their shares." To demand an appraisal, shareholders must qualify as
holders of record and satisfy any continuous holding requirement.55 Who
qualifies as a holder of record is determined by the issuing corporation's own
records (and those of its transfer agent).5 6
The examples above highlight the fundamental role of the stock ledger and
corporate records in American corporate law. The corporation's stock ledger is more
than a mere record of share ownership. It provides access to important shareholder
rights such as voting and serves as prima facie evidence of stock ownership for
purposes of exercising shareholder rights such as inspection of books and records.
As such, errors in the stock ledger are more than an internal corporate matter. Errors
can adversely affect shareholders and give rise to litigation. Therefore, corporations
and their shareholders have an interest in ensuring the accuracy of the corporations'
stock ledgers."
B. The Evolution ofRecordkeeping Practices
The importance of stock ledgers and the universally shared interest in ensuring
accurate records of stock ownership raise an important yet underappreciated issue-
whether the methods currently used by corporations to maintain stock ledgers are up
to the task. Related is the question of whether the modern system of recording stock
transactions (or trades) facilitates or obstructs the objective of accurate and verifiable
records. In a world where the purchase and sale of shares can occur in the blink of
an eye, do corporations have the tools to quickly verify transactions and efficiently
update stock ownership records? Does the system of recording stock transactions do
enough to mitigate the risk of inaccuracies and allow for efficient reconciliation of
discrepancies? To assess these questions properly, it is necessary to have a basic
understanding of how corporations go about recording stock transactions, including
share issuances and transfers.
In days gone by, corporations uniformly recorded stock transactions in paper
ledgers. Few modern corporations of any size continue this practice today. However,
it is a useful starting point. In a 1914 Yale Law Journal article, Thaddeus D.
Kenneson described the typical method of recording a stock transfer as follows:
[A company] will probably have three books; one known as the
"transfer" book, another as the stock certificate book, and a third as the
stock ledger. In the "transfer" book will be printed blank "transfers" in
this form: "For value received ... hereby assign and transfer unto ...
shares in the capital stock of [the company]." The certificate will contain
printed blank certificates with margins for entering the time of issuing
the certificate, the number of shares, the number of the certificate and to
whom issued. The stock ledger will contain an account with each
54. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 262(a).
55. Id.
56. Bjerre, supra note 11, at 1320.
57. Id. at 1320-21 ("[I]ssuers need a fixed and reliable list of their security holders.").
232 [Vol. 96:223
BLOCKCHAIN STOCK LEDGERS
shareholder, in which he is credited with all shares "transferred" by
others to him and debited with all shares "transferred" by him to others.58
Today, the system of transferring shares and the manner of keeping ownership
records are drastically different. The story, however, involves more than just the
advent of new technology and a shift to electronic recordkeeping. While some
corporations still maintain the equivalent of a paper stock ledger via use of electronic
bookkeeping software,59 the growth of capital markets has led to: (1) an increasingly
complicated structure of stock ownership,60 and (2) the outsourcing of stock records
to agents of the corporation.61 All of this contributes additional layers of complexity
when it comes to the once simple task of a corporation itself recording ownership of
stock held directly by the corporation's shareholders.
The most significant changes arose as a response to Wall Street's "paperwork
crisis" of the late 1960s and early 1970s.62 At the time, transferring ownership of
stock involved a labor-intensive process, which required the delivery of paper stock
certificates between buyers and sellers. 63 However, processing and settling each
transaction also required clerks, working at the securities firms, to complete all
of the accompanying transfer paperwork.64  By some accounts, the
accompanying paperwork averaged "thirty-three different forms for a single
security transfer."65 However, the growth of capital markets and increase in
trading volume made the continuation of this paper-based system
impracticable.66 As is well known, brokerage firms simply could not keep up
with the paperwork demands, which caused delays in the processing of
transaction settlements and failed deliveries.67
One particularly vivid account described the scene as involving stock
certificates and related documents piled halfway to the ceiling, clerical
personnel working overtime, and firms adding a second or third shift to process
daily transactions .
58. Thaddeus D. Kenneson, Purchases for Value Without Notice, 23 YALE L.J. 193, 200
(1914).
59. See, e.g., Boris v. Schaheen, No. 8160-VCN, 2013 WL 6331287, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec.
2, 2013) (discussing documentation of stock issuances on an Excel stock ledger).
60. See Massey, supra note 16, at 716.
61. See Bjerre, supra note 11, at 1320-21 (discussing the outsourcing of stock ledgers to
transfer agents).
62. See id.; Donald, supra note 11, at 50.
63. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1237 n.48 (2008) (discussing the labor-intensiveprocess of delivering stock
certificates between buyers and sellers); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This
Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
291, 310 (1994) (noting that delivery of a physical certificate was required for transfer of
ownership; Bryn R. Vaaler, Revised Article 8 of the Mississippi UCC: Dealing Directly with
Indirect Holding, 66 Miss. L.J. 249, 254-60 (1996) (noting that delivery of a physical stock
certificate was required to evidence a change in ownership).
64. See Donald, supra note 11, at 50.
65. Id. (citing a study performed by North American Rockwell Information Systems).
66. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Jul. 13, 2015); Bjerre, supra note 11, at 1320-21.
67. See Donald, supra note 11, at 50.
68. Suellen M. Wolfe, Escheat and the Concept of Apportionment: A Bright Line Test to
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Ultimately, to give members time to catchup on paperwork, the New York Stock
Exchange opted "to close for one day per week and hold abbreviated trading hours
during their remaining business days."69
To resolve the "paperwork crisis" and increase the efficiency of settlement
activity, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") adopted a national policy
of share immobilization, which eliminated the need for the majority of legal
transfers. To accomplish this, the SEC added a central depositary to the ownership
chain-the Depositary Trust Company ("DTC").71 With DTC in place as the only
domestic depositary, banks and brokers could now participate as members of DTC
with accounts maintained at DTC.7 2 Banks and brokers no longer needed to hold
shares through their own nominees.7 3 Instead, shares could be registered in the name
of DTC's nominee-Cede & Co. ("Cede").7 4
Today, DTC (through its nominee Cede) effectively holds shares on behalf of its
participants (over 800 custodial banks and brokers) in fungible bulk.75 DTC uses
electronic book entries to reflect net changes in the ownership of its participants each
trading day-debiting participant accounts for sales and crediting participant
accounts for purchases.7 6 Cede, however, remains the registered owner on the books
of the corporation that issued the stock.7 As a result, share transfers today largely
take place via book-entry transactions at  central depository and do not require
registration of transfers with the corporation who issued the stock. This solves the
"paperwork crisis" by eliminating the need for physical delivery of stock
certificates78 and increases efficiency by allowing for an unlimited number of trades
or transactions among participants without changing the registered owner of the
share.79
Despite solving the "paperwork crisis," the adoption of a policy of share
immobilization and the consequent rise of an indirect holding system80 has
Slice a Shadow, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 181 n.49 (1995) (citing SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R.
Doc. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 35 (1971)).
69. Donald, supra note 11, at 52.




74. Id.; see also NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/c/cede
[https://perma.cc/D7JD-QQZK] (defining Cede & Co. as the nominee name for The
Depository Trust Company, a large clearing house that holds shares in its name for banks,
brokers and institutions in order to expedite the sale and transfer of stock).
75. See Brooks, supra note 15, at 210-11; Mooney, supra note 15, at 317 n.23.
76. Brooks, supra note 15, at 210; see also Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d
723, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Brown, supra note 16, at 722; Hakes, supra note 16, at 711
(discussing the process of netting); Kahan & Rock, supra note 63, at 1239; Vaaler, supra note
63, at 297.
77. Id.; see also Donald, supra note 11, at 62.
78. Donald, supra note 11, at 62.
79. Brooks, supra note 15, at 210-11.
80. See Bjerre, supra note 11, at 1320-21; Donald, supra note 11, at 50 (discussing the
rise of the indirect holding system); Matt Levine, Dole Food Had Too Many Shares,
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complicated the maintenance of stock ownership records. As an initial matter,
modern stock ownership commonly involves the bifurcation of record holders (those
legally recognized as shareholders) from economic or beneficial owners (those with
a financial stake in the corporation).8 1 As such, stock ownership is no longer a simple
matter involving the corporation and a shareholder who directly holds shares in
their own name. 2 In some cases, a broker holds shares on behalf of their client/
customer (the beneficial owner), but has the legal status of shareholder because
those shares are registered in the brokers' names.83 In other cases, brokers hold
shares in "street name" on behalf of their clients/customers (the beneficial owners)
but actually hold the shares in accounts with DTC (with DTC's nominee Cede
registered as the record holder of the share).84 Accordingly, the name listed in the
corporation's stock ledger as the registered holder can be several layers removed
from the true beneficial owner of the share. The Delaware Chancery Court
described the increasingly complex structure of stock ownership as follows:
CEDE & Co. is the name utilized by Depository Trust Company ....
[DTC] is an association of . . . brokerage houses and financial
institutions[,] which was formed for the purpose of owning shares held
in street name for the beneficial interest of customers of the brokerage
firms and financial institutions. In other words, the name "CEDE & Co."
appearing on the corporate stock ledger is thrice removed from the true
beneficial owner. The brokerage house owns the stock for the benefit of
its customer, but it holds title through the Depository Trust Company[,]
which in turn uses the name CEDE & Co. for this purpose.85
From a recordkeeping perspective, this means that records (other than those
maintained by the corporation itself such as the corporation's stock ledger and stock
list) are now essential to the determination of stock ownership (both legal and
beneficial) along with the associated rights of such ownership. The relevant records
may now include the transfer agent's books, DTC's transfer books, and the Cede
breakdown.86 Absent these additional records, it would be impracticable (perhaps
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017
-02-17/dole-food-had-too-many-shares [https://perma.cc/4EF2-ZZWC].
81. See Donald, supra note 11, at 62.
82. See Massey, supra note 16, at 716 (noting the increasingly complicated structure of
stock ownership, which includes beneficial owners holding shares in their own names, brokers
and banks holding shares in their own names on behalf of clients, and depositaries holding
shares of such nominees as Cede & Co.).
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 63, at 1237; Donald, supra note 11, at 60-61
(noting that in 2009, the central depository held almost $34 trillion in securities and processed
and average of over ninety million transactions a day); Brown, supra note 16, at 687-88
(describing the term "street name").
85. RB Assoc.'s. of New Jersey, L.P. v. Gillette Co., No. 9711, 1988 WL 27731, at *3
(Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1988).
86. Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 171 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that corporations
outsource a part of their stock ledger, the Cede breakdown, to DTC); See Bjerre, supra note
11, at 1320-21 (noting that corporations outsource a part of their stock ledger to transfer
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even impossible) to decipher the layers of stock ownership. In fact, in many cases, a
corporation's stock ledger may simply list Cede as the registered shareholder.
Corporations, therefore, have effectively outsourced a part of their stock ledgers and
corporate recordkeeping.87 The result of this system is that, in many cases, there is
no efficient and reliable way to audit discrepancies in stock ownership. As discussed
below, there are simply too many layers to untangle.
C. The Current System and the Problem ofIndirect Holding
The move to a national policy of share immobilization has effectively resolved
the paperwork crisis,88 but the potential for errors and unresolvable discrepancies in
stock ownership records persists. To be certain, no system of recordkeeping is
immune from errors. A paper stock ledger suffers from the possibility of a data entry
error or miscalculation. In addition, the number of errors in broker records is known
to have exacerbated the "paperwork crisis" of the late 1960s and early 1970s.89 Even
so, the complexity of the current system-with its layers of beneficial owners,
custodians, nominees, and record holders-has created a new set of problems. The
complexity prevents corporations from determining stock ownership in real time.
Moreover, it hinders the ability of corporations and the judiciary to effectively audit
transactions or otherwise reconcile discrepancies.
Legal disputes involving stock ownership records are far from unusual. However,
the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in In re Dole Food Co., Stockholder
Litigation stands out because it highlights the limitations of current methods of
recordkeeping and hints at a better technology-based alternative. In that particular
case, Dole completed a going-private transaction via a single-step merger.90 Dole
distributed the merger consideration, $13.50 per share, to its stockholders of record.91
Cede (as nominee for DTC) was among the stockholders of record.92 DTC then
distributed the merger consideration to its participant members in accordance with
DTC's centralized ledger.93 A class action suit ensued. For purposes of this Article,
the legal claims alleged by the plaintiffs in the class action are irrelevant. However,
the events that followed parties' agreement o settle are not.
According to the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to settle the class
action claims in exchange for payment of $2.74 per share plus interest.94 For purpose
of identifying those entitled to payment, the class was defined as including "all record
holders and beneficial owners of common stock of Dole during the period
commencing June 11, 2013, and ending November 1, 2013, together with their
agents).
87. Id.
88. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *2 (Del. Ch. July
30, 2015).
89. See Wolfe, supra note 68, at 181 n.49.
90. No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017).






successors and assigns."95 However, the definition expressly excluded certain
holders of Dole stock-specifically the defendants, those affiliated with the
defendants, and ten petitions in a related appraisal action.96 After excluding these
holders, the class was comprised of holders of 36,793,758 shares of In re stock.97
Despite the size of the class, facially eligible claims were submitted by holders of
49,164,415 shares-a discrepancy of over 12.3 million shares.98
On its face, the sheer size of the discrepancy found in Dole is significant. But the
truly eye-opening admission was that there was simply no way to reconcile the
discrepancy.99 Despite diligent efforts by the settlement administrator and the class
counsel, Vice Chancellor Laster described the exercise as "functionally impossible"
and "fundamentally uncertain."0
Vice Chancellor Laster noted that resolving the discrepancy would require
detailed records from millions of trades. 1 Complicating matters was the fact that no
single entity maintained a comprehensive record of each trade. DTC's centralized
ledger, for example, only showed the net change in number of shares by its
participants.10 2 Consequently, unraveling ownership would require records from
over 800 participants (i.e., brokers and custodial banks) and their individual
clients. 103 Even if all the records were obtained, determining actual ownership of the
shares would demand "a forensic audit of herculean proportions."0 4 Such an audit
would likely uncover additional disputes, making resolution of the discrepancy
impracticable. 105
The result in Dole highlights serious shortcomings in the indirect holding system
that arose from the federal policy of share immobilization. Specifically, the policy of
share immobilization (and its bifurcation of record holders from beneficial owners)
prevents a real-time determination of ownership because the system involves too
many record-keepers.106 Moreover, the added layers of intermediaries make
reconciliation of share discrepancies expensive and uncertain.1 7
It is also important to mention that Dole is not an outlier. Rather, many
corporations have encountered problems with the indirect holding system.108 Two





99. Id. at *3-4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *3.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *3.




108. See id. at *4, n.1 (noting that despite efforts to keep the system going, the problems
have grown); see also In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re
Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 2015).
109. See Dell, 143 A.3d 20; Dell, 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015).
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In the first case, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the beneficial owners of
922,257 shares of Dell's common stock (three mutual funds and two retirement
plans) forfeited their appraisal rights. " The beneficial owners sought appraisal
rights in connection with a going-private merger announced by Dell."'
Unfortunately, as beneficial owners, neither the mutual funds nor the
retirement plans, held legal title.112 Rather, they held the shares indirectly
through intermediaries (in this case accounts at custodial banks). Accordingly,
the record holder of the shares was Cede & Co.1 13 Despite having beneficial
ownership at all relevant times, the mutual funds and retirement plans did not
continuously hold the shares (as required by statute)."4 The court reasoned that
an administrative name change in the record holder of the shares-an act
necessitated by the indirect holding system-broke the chain of title.11 5 In doing so,
the court observed that he indirect holding system solved the "paperwork crisis"
while complicating other aspects of the legal system-like the exercise of
appraisal rights.1 1 6 Specifically, the complexities of the indirect holding system
impeded the exercise of appraisal rights because the beneficial owners were not the
legal holders identified in Dell's records.
In the second Dell case, the Delaware Chancery Court again held that certain
beneficial owners of Dell stock (mutual funds sponsored by T. Rowe Price &
Associates) forfeited their appraisal rights.1 17 Despite beneficial owners opposing
the merger, the beneficial owners' shares were inadvertently voted in favor of the
merger via a "daisy chain" of intermediaries.1 ' In short, the complexities of the
indirect holding system-specifically, required approvals from a series of
intermediaries-resulted in the record holder's voting the shares for the merger
against the wishes of the beneficial owner.119 Thus, bifurcation of ownership
and the policy of share immobilization created what the court described as a
"byzantine and path-dependent system."120 The resulting procedural complexities
prevent beneficial owners from interfacing directly with the issuing company,
opening the door for intervening problems.121 As such, the complexities of the
indirect holding system contributed in part to the inability of stockholders to
effectively exercise their rights.
The foregoing illustrates systemic problems associated with the current policy
of share immobilization, indirect holding, and bifurcated ownership. Dole shows
how the introduction of intermediaries complicates recordkeeping in two
significant ways. First, no person maintains a single comprehensive record of
current stock ownership. Because of this, there is no way to make reliable real-time
determinations
110. Dell, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015).
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *8-10.
115. Id. at *3, 8-10.
116. Id. at *2.
117. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016).
118. Id. at 21, 56.





of beneficial stock ownership.12 2 Rather, the process requires significant time and
effort-specifically, the aggregation of corporate records with those maintained by
involved intermediaries and their clients.123
Second, the sheer number of transactions, records, and parties involved raises
legitimate questions about the viability of any attempt to audit. 121 Initially, obtaining
all necessary records may prove difficult if not impossible. Without a single
comprehensive record of ownership, any person conducting an audit would need to
gather records of thousands of transactions spread across all involved intermediaries
and their clients. 125 Even if all necessary records were collected, the audit could
uncover additional disputes or record-keeping errors.126 Attempts to audit simply
suffer from too many records and too many recordkeepers. Because of this, the
potential exists for missing records or other errors among records maintained by
various entities to prevent an audit from accurately tracing ownership through all
relevant stock transactions. As such, the realities of the current system effectively
prevent verification of stock ownership in the event of a dispute.
The two Dell cases highlight a wholly different problem with the current system.
Specifically, bifurcated ownership can complicate the ability of beneficial owners of
stock to exercise their rights by creating needless administrative technicalities.127
Among other things, the addition of intermediaries can lead to procedural
complexities that result in record holders of stock acting contrary to the wishes of the
beneficial owner. 128 In short, it creates an increased risk of process failure interfering
with important shareholder rights like voting.
In sum, the current system effectively redressed problems created by the
explosion of stock transactions and the inability of a paper-based system of recording
trades to keep pace. However, a concomitant problem has emerged. Recent cases
accentuate the adverse consequences of the federal policy of share immobilization
and bifurcated ownership. Notwithstanding unsatisfactory results, the current system
remains entrenched. Despite little real effort to improve or replace the current system,
the decision in Dole may be a tipping point as it makes explicit mention of the
potential of a technological solution-specifically, the blockchain.129 Thus, it signals
a need for development of technological improvements to simplify corporate
recordkeeping and ensure that stock ownership records are both accurate and
verifiable.
122. See In re Dole Food Co., Inc., Shareholder Litigation, No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL
624843, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017) (noting that without obtaining millions of records, it is




125. Id. at *4.
126. Id.
127. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re Appraisal of
Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 2015).
128. See Dell, 143 A.3d 20; Dell, 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015).
129. Dole, 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.l.
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II. THE BLOCKCHAIN SOLUTION?
Given the systemic problems outlined in Part I and the judiciary's signaling of a
need to examine the ongoing efficacy of the current system, some state l gislatures
have started to revisit the process of effectuating and recording stock transactions.
The Delaware Chancery Court's decision in Dole foreshadowed the arrival of
technological solutions focused on the application of blockchain to corporate
recordkeeping.131
For example, the Delaware General Assembly amended the DGCL to permit the
use of blockchain technology in the maintenance of corporate records.13 1 Delaware's
openness to blockchain-based corporate records is noteworthy. Delaware is the
preeminent state for incorporation.13 2 The state is home to a well-developed body of
corporate law, 133 and its judiciary is highly regarded for corporate law expertise.134
As such, Delaware's embrace of corporate law applications for blockchain
technology has the potential to influence American corporate law more broadly.
Delaware, however, is not the only state to explore the ways in which blockchain
technology may benefit corporate law. Arizona, California, Maryland, Texas, and
Wyoming have also enacted amendments o expressly accommodate blockchain-
based corporate records.135 Other states, such as New Jersey, have considered similar
legislation.136 This legislative activity marks a significant step because it paves the
way for corporations to start developing and testing blockchain-based solutions for
the systemic issues that currently hinder the ability of corporations to maintain
accurate stock ownership records. Specifically, amending state corporate codes
enables a meaningful examination of whether the blockchain offers a technological
solution for the reality facing many corporations-the inability to determine with
certainty who owns each of the corporation's shares at any moment in time. If so,
corporations may have a means of preventing or at least mitigating the problems that
arise from the current policy of share immobilization.
130. Id.
131. S.B. 69, 149th Leg. (Del. 2017); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c), § 224
(2020); Allison L. Land & Edward P. Welch, Delaware Law Amendments and the
Maintenance of Corporate Records via Blockchain, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE,
(May 1, 2017) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/01/delaware-law-amendments-and-
the-maintenance-of-corporate-records-via-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/CV39-LXN3];
O'Toole et al., supra note 20.
132. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1909 (1998).
133. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1016-17 (1997); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How
We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 673, 679-81 (2005).
134. Strine, supra note 133, at 682-83; see also, Kamar, supra note 132, at 1925.
135. See S.B. 136 (Md. 2019) (effective Oct. 1, 2019); S.B. 838 (Cal. 2018) (approved by
California's governor on Sep. 28, 2018); H.B. 2603, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018)
(signed by Arizona's governor on Apr. 3, 2018); H.B. 101 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo.
2018) (signed by Wyoming's governor on Mar. 10, 2018).
136. See Assemb. B. 3768, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018).
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A. State Blockchain Amendments
The substance of amendments to enable the use of blockchain technology in
corporate recordkeeping are relatively simple. For example, the central component
of the DGCL amendment provides express statutory authority for Delaware
corporations to use blockchain technology in creating and administering internal
corporate records (including the corporation's stock ledger). 137 Accordingly, the
amendments make necessary technical changes to enable the use of blockchain
technology by Delaware corporations. The core changes appear in Section 224 and
Section 219 of the DGCL.
Section 224 contains the express statutory authority to use blockchain technology.
In relevant part, it now provides that:
"Any records administered by or on behalf of the corporation . . .
including its stock ledger . .. may be kept on, or by means of, or be in
the form of, any information storage device, method, or one or more
electronic networks or databases (including one or more distributed
electronic networks or databases)."138
As amended, Section 224 makes it clear that Delaware corporations need not
maintain the records directly or through an agent.139 Instead, corporate records may
be administered on behalf of the corporation.140 Section 224 also adds "[one] or more
distributed electronic networks or databases" as a permissible method of
administering corporate records.141 In doing so, Section 224 expressly recognizes the
use of distributed ledgers and blockchain technology, which function without a
central administrator.
Regardless of how a Delaware corporation elects to maintain or administer its
records, Section 224 preserves the requirement that corporate records must be
capable of conversion into clearly legible paper form within a reasonable time.14 2
Section 224, however, requires additional minimum requirements for stock ledgers.
With respect to stock ledgers, the records must: (1) permit preparation of a list of
stockholders; (2) record the information specified in Sections 156, 159, 217(a), and
218 of the DGCL; and (3) record transfers of stock. 143 Therefore, any Delaware
corporation that implements a blockchain-based stock ledger must ensure that it is
capable of satisfying the foregoing requirements.
Other necessary changes appear in Section 219 of the DGCL. For example, the
amendments delete the Section 219(a) requirement that the officer who has charge
of the stock ledger prepare a complete list of stockholders before very meeting of
stockholders.144 Instead, Section 219(a) simply requires that the corporation prepare
137. See, e.g., Santori, supra note 20; O'Toole et al., supra note 20.
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the list of stockholders.145 This recognizes that a distributed ledger, by definition,
does not have a central administrator.146 No corporate officer (or any single person)
will have direct charge of a blockchain-based stock ledger. Instead, the use of
distributed ledgers means that the corporation's record of stock transactions is shared
and synchronized across multiple sites, institutions, or geographies.14 7
In addition, Section 219(c) adds a new definition for the term "stock ledger."148
The definition is consistent with Section 224 and similarly contemplates blockchain
stock ledgers. In relevant part, a stock ledger is defined as:
"[One] or more records administered by or on behalf of the corporation
in which the names of all the corporation's stockholders of record, the
address and number of shares registered in the name of each such
stockholder, and all issuances and transfers of stock of the corporation
are recorded in accordance with [the DGCL]." 149 This definition
specifically addresses the distributed nature of the blockchain, which
means that there is no central store of transaction data. Rather, a network
of computers store and independently update copies of the ledger.
In sum, the scope of the amendments is relatively limited. At core, the
amendments comprise several technical changes necessary to expressly allow for the
use of blockchain technology in corporate recordkeeping. But the significance of the
amendments is in opening the door to the development and implementation of
blockchain-based technological solutions to the longstanding problem of
discrepancies in stock ownership records. By amending the DGCL to expressly
permit blockchain records and stock ledgers, Delaware has eliminated a legal
impediment to innovation and progress. That is not to say that blockchain will solve
all the systemic problems that have contributed to needless complexity and
discrepancies in stock ownership records. In fact, it may take years for corporations
to move en masse to blockchain-based corporate records (if they ever do). But
Delaware's amendments to the DGCL (and similar amendments to other state
corporate codes) remove uncertainty and provide an important opportunity to
evaluate the potential of blockchain solutions.
B. The Potential of Corporate Blockchains
What is blockchain and how can it be applied to corporate recordkeeping?
Blockchain is best known as the technology underlying cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin." Cryptocurrency, however, is just one application of blockchain
145. Id.
146. Shaan Ray, The Difference Between Blockchains and Distributed Ledger Technology,
TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-difference-between-
blockchains-distributed-ledger-technology-42715a0fa92 [https://perma.cc/KWX3-2DME].
147. Id.
148. Tit. 8, § 219(a).
149. Id.
150. See Fairfield, supra note 25, at 808; Santori, supra note 20; Adam Sulkowski,
Blockchain, Business Supply Chains, Sustainability, and Law: The Future of Governance,
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technology.151 In that context, blockchain technology creates a record of
cryptocurrency transactions-each transfer of Bitcoin from one person to another.
But the technology is not limited to cryptocurrency transactions.1 2 At core, the
technology simply provides a method of creating and storing an ongoing record of
transactions. Any kind of transaction can be created and stored. A blockchain,
therefore, is simply "a ledger of transactions between parties on a network."5 3
To proponents of blockchain technology, the potential applications are boundless.
Outside the cryptocurrency context, it has been suggested that blockchain technology
could disrupt and create efficiencies in wide-ranging areas such as: (1) real estate
and land titling," (2) global supply chain management,155 (3) education,156
(4) healthcare,15" and (5) voting.158
Similarly, blockchain technology has the potential to transform global stock
trading and improve the ability of corporations to maintain accurate records of each
stock transaction, including up to date ownership information.159 Understanding the
Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 524 (2018).
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intricacies of blockchain technology is beyond the scope of this Article. But
understanding the features of blockchain technology that have the potential to
provide a more efficient method of administering and recording stock trades provides
essential context about innovating corporate recordkeeping and global capital
markets (including corresponding improvements o American corporate law).
First, blockchain technology provides a digital mechanism for recording
information about a transaction.160 At its core, blockchain technology functions as a
type of electronic database.161 Accordingly, corporations can use blockchain
technology to record transaction specific information regarding each transfer of the
corporation's stock such as number of shares and the participants involved.1 6 2
Second, blockchain creates a continuous record of all transactions.16 3 Transaction
records are never deleted. 164 Instead, blockchain technology updates and adds new
WYMAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL MARKETS THE PRIZE AND THE JOURNEY (Feb. 2016),
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transaction records to an ever growing "chain" of data. 165 In doing so, blockchain
creates an immutable record of every transaction from the very first to the most
recent.166 As applied to stock transactions, blockchain could record every issuance,
trade, put, and call, including number of shares and ownership of those shares.
Third, blockchain is both decentralized and distributed, which distinguishes it
from traditional electronic databases. 167 The blockchain is decentralized because
there is no central authority or trusted administrator charged with maintaining
the ledger.168 This means that neither the corporation nor any agent of the
corporation is responsible for updating the ledger. Blockchain is distributed
because there is no central store of data.169 Instead, blockchain relies on the
use of independent computers in a network to simultaneously record transactions
in multiple places at he same time.7
How then does a blockchain-based ledger operate? Without a central authority or
trusted administrator, blockchain relies on consensus to approve each record before
it is added to the chain.171 Blockchain technology, therefore, depends on a transfer of
trust from institutions to systems. Instead of a central authority, blockchain records
rely on a system of consensus.17 2 In short, each computer on a network maintains its
own identical copy of the ledger. Each computer works independently to reach a
conclusion on approval of new transaction records. The computers then come to an
agreement via an algorithm before blockchain is updated. In a sense, the computers
work independently then communicate with the most "popular" result becoming the
West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REv. 897, 910, 914
(2018).
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increases settlement imes, transactions costs and potential for errors); Ferrick, supra note 159,
at 652.
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Brakeville and Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distributed Ledgers, IBM
DEV. (Jun. 1, 2019), https://developer.ibm.com/tutorials/cl-blockchain-basics-intro-bluemix
-trs/ [https://perma.cc/MZE7-TL4Z].




official record. Thus, blockchain operates by consensually sharing and synchronizing
data across multiple computers in a network.17 3
Collectively, the features of blockchain technology (described above) hold the
potential to address the issues giving rise to the "paperwork crisis" while also solving
many of the systemic problems that have arisen from the current policy of share
immobilization.7 4 As an electronic mechanism of recordkeeping, blockchain
obviates the need for physical stock certificates and transfer paperwork. Accordingly,
if a blockchain solution were operationalized, it would likely function without giving
rise to the same "paperwork crisis" that ushered in the current system of share
immobilization and indirect holding.
More significantly, the features of blockchain could mitigate the systemic
problems highlighted in Dole and both Dell cases by eliminating the role of
intermediaries and restoring direct ownership of shares.
First, blockchain could eliminate the need for intermediaries in the process of
settlement and recording of stock transactions. Since blockchain is decentralized, a
central administrator does not authorize transactions or update the ledger.175 Instead,
a blockchain-based ledger is automatically updated to add new stock transactions as
consensus is achieved without the involvement of any intermediaries. 176 A
blockchain stock ledger, therefore, theoretically allows for faster verification and
settlement of stock transactions by eliminating the need for third-party approval.77
The plausible result is fewer delays and errors in the process of updating corporate
records. This carries the practical benefit of aiding corporations in making more
accurate (and potentially near real-time) determinations of stock ownership-an
improvement over both the prior paper-based system and the current policy of share
immobilization.17
Second, blockchain technology could create a single comprehensive record of all
transactions, rendering the need for intermediaries (like DTC, Cede, participant
brokers and custodial bank, or their customers) and indirect holding of shares
unnecessary.17 9 Instead, blockchain would record and store each stock transaction
along with associated transaction data.180 The most significant consequence of this
173. See Christina Majaski, Distributed Ledgers, INVESTOPEDIA (May 12, 2020),
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In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. Jul. 13, 2015).
175. See supra Section IIB.
176. See supra Section IIB.
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FORBES (Aug. 16, 2018, 11:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericervin/2018/08/16
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being the reunification of legal and beneficial stock ownership-eliminating the need
for registration of shares (and vesting of legal ownership) in a nominee (such as
Cede).181 By removing this step, a blockchain system could restore direct ownership
of shares between the issuing corporation and the shareholder.18 2
Simply put, if Suzy Shareholder purchases ten shares of Amazon.com, Inc.
("Amazon") stock, a blockchain-based system would update the record to add the
transaction and identify Suzy Shareholder as the new owner of those Amazon shares.
Amazon's stock ledger would then list Suzy Shareholder's name as the shareholder.
With Suzy Shareholder's name registered as the owner in the corporation's records,
the ultimate investor (a mere beneficial owner under the current system of share
immobilization) would stand as the legal owner. Suzy Shareholder is both the legal
owner and the beneficial owner of the share. There is no longer any distinction
because the process no longer involves DTC, Cede, or any of DTC's participant
brokers or custodial banks. There is no longer a separate and distinct record holder
of the shares. Therefore, the elimination of these intermediaries results in
simplification because ownership returns to a matter between two parties-the
corporation issuing the share and the person acquiring the share.
This restoration of direct holding could strip away layers of procedural
complexity. In doing so, blockchain addresses the two principal problems of the
current system-impracticability of auditing share ownership and impairment to the
exercise of shareholder ights by beneficial owners. 183
Under the current system, the resolution of a discrepancy in share ownership
necessitates a "forensic audit of herculean proportions."184 As described by Vice
Chancellor Laster in Dole, the process would require examination of detailed records
from millions of transactions spread across hundreds of participant banks and brokers
and each of their customers.185 Even then, the result is far from certain because such
an effort is likely to turn up additional disputes and discrepancies. 186 Vice Chancellor
Laster, therefore, concluded that any attempt to reconcile a share discrepancy under
the current system of share immobilization amounts to a functional impossibility.187
But having a single comprehensive record of all stock transactions on blockchain
obviates the issue. Reunification of bifurcated stock ownership means that there is
no need to reconcile legal and beneficial owners. Jettisoning intermediaries removes
the need to obtain and examine the disbursed records cited by Vice Chancellor
Laster. Instead, a single comprehensive record on blockchain increases transparency
and enables tracing of share ownership, which allows for meaningful audits in the
event of a share discrepancy or dispute. 188 In short, it makes resolution of
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The other problem posed by the current system is that procedural complexities
from the separation of legal and beneficial ownership have interfered with the
fair exercise of shareholder rights. 189 Bifurcation of ownership impedes
shareholder rights in different ways. At the onset, it complicates attempts by
corporations to accurately determine the group of shareholders entitled to rights
-whether voting, dissenters or otherwise.
Recall that Dole centered on the corporation's inability to properly distribute
settlement funds to the appropriate class of shareholders because of unresolvable
discrepancies in share ownership.190 Dole was simply unable to identify with
certainty the shareholders entitled to settlement funds.191 As discussed, blockchain
technology can facilitate audits and reconciliation of share discrepancies when a
dispute arises. By recording all stock transactions in a comprehensive electronic
ledger, blockchain improves transparency, eliminates the need for third-party
records, and allows for traceability of ownership.192 But the corollary benefit is that
this feature of blockchain also increases accuracy and certainty of initial
determinations of ownership by corporations. Restoration of direct share ownership
means that corporations will have access to a comprehensive record of each stock
transaction, including all current shareholders (not just legal owners). Not only does
this preclude the need for third-party records to identify beneficial shareholders, it
makes the additional step of identifying beneficial shareholders wholly unnecessary.
By simplifying the process, blockchain stock ledgers could minimize potential
errors or problems in reconciling disbursed records from different sources.
Blockchain stock ledgers could, therefore, allow corporations to make more accurate
determinations of ownership, providing greater certainty from the onset. The
potential impact goes beyond the specifics of Dole. While blockchain technology
could have provided greater accuracy and certainty in Dole's initial determination of
the shareholders entitled to settlement funds, the benefit extends to any situation
where accuracy of share ownership is consequential-for example the identification
of shareholders entitled to vote on important matters such as director elections or
mergers. Thus, the reunification of share ownership via blockchain could improve
certainty in proxy voting and the exercise of all shareholder ights.193
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/82a6366f/delaware
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Even if no question exists as to those entitled to shareholders' rights, the current
system of indirect holding can interfere with the actual exercise of those rights by
beneficial owners. In both Dell cases, beneficial owners of Dell stock were prevented
from exercising appraisal rights due to procedural complexities of indirect holding
and the bifurcation of stock ownership.194
In the first Dell case, shareholders were foreclosed from appraisal rights because
they failed to continuously hold the shares for the period required by statute.195
However, there was never a change in the ultimate investor who purchased the shares
(i.e., the beneficial owner). But because of share immobilization, the record holder
of the shares differed from the beneficial owner, and an administrative name change
of the record holder interrupted the required period of continuous holding.196 Thus,
a technicality necessitated by bifurcation of share ownership prevented shareholders
from obtaining appraisal rights-an incongruous, absurd and likely unintended
consequence of the current system of indirect holding.197
A blockchain-based system provides a fix. Recording stock transactions on
blockchain restores direct holding of shares, which abolishes the distinction between
record and beneficial holders of stock. Instead, the investor who acquires the shares
is registered as the owner in the books and records of the corporation. So the investor
is effectively both the record and beneficial holder of the shares. By removing the
intermediary, a blockchain system protects against the problem in Dell. Since a
distinct record holder no longer exits, the beneficial holder of the Dell shares would
now satisfy the "continuous holding" requirement for exercise of appraisal rights.
Reunification of ownership via administration of stock transaction blockchain,
therefore, has the ability to protect against the risk of intervening issues from
derailing the proper exercise of shareholder ights by beneficial holders of stock.
In the second Dell case, shareholders lost their appraisal rights by voting in favor
of a merger-a result that is consistent with the statutory limitation of those rights to
those shareholders who vote against he merger.198 However, the shares were voted
contrary to the wishes of the beneficial owners who actually opposed the merger.199
The procedural complexities of the indirect holding system-specifically required
approvals from a series of intermediaries-contributed to a breakdown in process.200
As a result, shares were inadvertently voted in favor of the merger, which led to the
forfeiture of appraisal rights.201 Again, the ability of beneficial owners to exercise
their rights as shareholders suffers because of the complexities of indirect holding.
A blockchain-based system may again offer a solution. By removing
intermediaries from the process of administering and recording stock transactions,
the potential for procedural complexities to derail the exercise of shareholders' rights
by beneficial owners is minimized. In Dell, for example, direct ownership of shares
194. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20 (Del. Ch. 2016); Dell, 2015 WL 4313206
(Del. Ch. July 30, 2015); see also Laster, supra note 179.
195. Dell, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3, 8-10 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015).
196. Id.
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198. Dell, 143 A.3d at 59; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(a).
199. Dell, 143 A.3d at 21, 56.
200. Id. at 29.
201. Id. at 22, 29.
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via blockchain would mean that no intermediaries exist between the issuing
corporation and the shareholder. Without intermediaries (and the need for a "daisy
chain" of approvals from a series of intermediaries), it is more likely that the shares
would have been voted in accordance with the intent of the shareholders seeking
appraisal rights in Dell. Thus, a blockchain-based system may reduce the likelihood
of process failure by eliminating layers of intermediaries along with their associated
complexities. Shareholders could also benefit to the extent that these procedural
complexities thwart heir exercise of appraisal rights, voting rights, and the like.
Both Dell cases highlight how the current system hinders the exercise of
shareholder rights. In contrast, one of the chief advantages of a blockchain-based
system is that it not only resolves the problems in both Dell cases, but also facilitates
the exercise of shareholder ights more broadly.20 2
In sum, a blockchain-based system could offer many advantages over the current
system of share immobilization through elimination of: (1) intermediaries, (2)
indirect holding, and (3) bifurcated share ownership.203 Corporations that adopt a
blockchain stock ledger may obtain several benefits, including greater certainty in
initial determinations of stock ownership, the ability to audit and trace ownership in
the event of a dispute, and the removal of procedural complexities that may prevent
the valid exercise of shareholders rights.204 Therefore, blockchain technology has the
potential to revolutionize the way that corporations administer and record stock
transactions.
The potential of blockchain, however, is not necessarily restricted to improved
efficiencies for corporate recordkeeping and governance. The benefits could extend
more broadly to global capital markets.2 5 To the extent that blockchain technology
is scalable, it could replace the underlying infrastructure of stock markets and
exchanges for all stock issuances and trades, increasing transparency and speed of
settlement.206 Accordingly, the potential of blockchain in corporate law ranges from
causing incremental disruption to growth into a sustaining innovation.207
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III. THE FUTURE OF BLOCKCHAINS IN CORPORATE LAW
Despite the potential of blockchain to resolve problems inherent in the standing
policy share immobilization,208 the future of blockchain stock ledgers is far from
certain. Development and implementation of a new blockchain-based system is far
from assured. Any number of challenges could derail it from successfully
supplanting the entrenched system.209 As such, a valid question arises about whether
states ought to alter corporate law to accommodate a technology that may never
develop or attain widespread acceptance. Perhaps counterintuitively, this Article
concludes that now is the time to amend corporate codes to expressly permit the use
of blockchain-based records.
A. Potential Hurdles
As the application of blockchain technology to corporate stock ledgers moves
from theory to reality, it is necessary to acknowledge that potential hurdles exist to
its successful implementation as an alternative to the current system. A brief
discussion of the chief challenges follows. These include legal uncertainty, cost, and
various challenges of operationalization.
1. Legal Uncertainty and Risk
State corporate law is the most obvious potential impediment to the development
and adoption of blockchain stock ledgers. Most states do not clearly authorize the
administration of corporate records on blockchain.21 Instead, state corporate law
often generally indicates that the corporation must maintain corporate records.211
This, however, rules out the use of blockchain technology, or at least calls it into
question.212 Blockchains are decentralized and have no central administrator.213
Accordingly, neither the corporation nor any other person would have
responsibility for maintaining records on blockchain.2 " The functionality of
the technology, therefore, creates an incongruence with the corporate law of most
states.
While a handful of states have amended their corporate codes to
expressly authorize the use of blockchain technology,215 legal uncertainty persists
in all other jurisdictions. In the absence of express authorization, development of a
biockchain-
208. See supra Part II.
209. See infra Section III.A.
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corporate records using blockchain technology).
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20201 251
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
based system of recordkeeping is hamstrung. There is less incentive for corporations
or other private actors to invest in and further explore the viability of blockchain for
corporate records if there is no assurance that American corporate law will ever
evolve to accommodate it. Simply put, why spend the time and resources to develop
a blockchain system if corporate law does not currently (and may never) permit its
use? Even if someone accepts that risk, the process of creating and implementing a
viable blockchain solution is still hampered. The lack of express authorization to use
blockchain in most jurisdictions restricts real-world testing, making it more difficult
to meaningfully assess any developing blockchain system. In short, corporate law
seemingly creates a misalignment of incentives and helps to preserve the status quo
by deterring innovation-specifically, efforts to leverage blockchain to improve the
problems created by the current system.
The legal risk created by state corporate law could contribute to the failure to
develop a successful blockchain stock ledger and system of administering corporate
records. However, a relatively simple solution exists. States that have not done so
could follow the lead of states like Delaware, and adopt an enabling amendment,
which expressly authorizes the use of blockchain technology.216 Such an amendment
is an appropriate and measured step. Rather than wholly replace the incumbent
system and mandate that corporations switch to blockchain, states that follow the
Delaware approach would simply open the door to blockchain.217 Corporations could
then choose to use blockchain stock ledgers or not. Removal of the legal barrier to
blockchain records would not assure its development and success. Instead,
corporations might still decide against pursuing blockchain for reasons other than
legal risk and uncertainty-for example cost. Therefore, amending state corporate
law would simply pave the way for incremental progress and adoption of blockchain
stock ledgers if it proves to be the right solution.
2. Cost
Moving away from any entrenched system is a potentially expensive proposition.
In this case, the costs start with development of new systems and tools (or the
acquisition of such systems and tools) for the administration of corporate records on
blockchain. Additional costs of moving to a blockchain-based system include
transition costs such as installation, testing, and education. Learning to operate a new
system may continue to impose costs as well-for example a lack of experience to
rely upon when issues or problems arise for the first time. Together, these costs may
deter both the pursuit of blockchain stock ledgers and their widespread adoption.
Although all corporations would benefit from a solution that eliminates the
problems of the current system of intermediaries and share immobilization, joint
action is unlikely due to a collective action problem of sorts. Without cooperation
and cost/risk sharing, fewer may be willing or able to bear the cost of developing a
216. S.B. 69.
217. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 224 (allowing corporations to choose administration
of corporate records via blockchain technology, not mandating that they do so).
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blockchain-based alternative on their own.218 In addition, little incentive may exist
to independently do so.
First, the problems presented by the current system, while significant, have not
risen to the level of the "paperwork crisis," which threatened to grind capital markets
to a standstill.219 Absent such a dire problem to drive change, the ease of accepting
the status quo may win out over investment in a new and uncertain technological
solution.
Second, the first to develop and adopt a blockchain-based system may face
something akin to a first-mover disadvantage.220 That is, the first mover bears the
brunt of the costs and the entirety of the risk of failure-either in development of a
workable solution or with its widespread adoption. Even if blockchain stock ledgers
become the norm, there may be little lasting advantage from being the first to
successfully develop and implement a blockchain-based system of administering
corporate records.221 Instead, others could move quickly to adopt blockchain stock
ledgers and obtain the benefits of an improved system without the same cost or risk.
In addition, any marketing, branding, or reputational benefit of being first would
likely fade over time.222
To be clear, cost alone will not deter all investment in a blockchain solution. Some
still see a place for blockchain technology in the future of stock transactions,
including in the issuance and transfer of shares. Most notably NASDAQ, several
foreign exchanges, and tZERO (a subsidiary of Overstock.com) continue to develop
applications, which include blockchain-based securities marketplaces and
exchanges.223 Even so, cost may factor into decisions by others to forego pursuing
blockchain. Cost, therefore, may reduce the number of firms actively working toward
a blockchain solution-ultimately slowing efforts to assess its viability. As a result,
cost may still hinder the development, implementation, and adoption of a blockchain
system.
218. But see Jordan French, Nasdaq Exec: Exchange is 'All-In' on Using Blockchain
Technology, THESTREET (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/nasdaq-all-in-
on-blockchain-technology-14551134 [https://perma.cc/J5XN-FHJE] (discussing continued
investment in blockchain solutions).
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220. William Boulding & Markus Christen, First-Mover Disadvantage, HARv. Bus. REv.
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The challenges of operationalizing blockchain for stock ledgers and more broadly
for effectuating global stock transactions fall into three general categories-
functionality concerns, transition issues,and incumbency advantage.
i. Functionality Concerns
Functionality concerns include various questions about the technical capability of
blockchain to provide a workable solution that improves upon the current system.
For example, questions persist about cybersecurity-specifically the susceptibility
of a blockchain-based system of stock ownership to a cyberattack from malicious
actors.224 Perhaps unfairly, new applications of blockchain technology may suffer
from a negative association with cryptocurrencies.2 5 Large scale hacks have plagued
cryptocurrency exchanges.226 To be clear, these hacks have not exposed security
weaknesses in blockchain itself-instead targeting linked systems by users of
blockchain.227 Even so, any system of blockchain stock ledgers must allay worries
that stockholders might suffer similar losses-even if those worries prove
unfounded. The challenge then is not only building a sufficiently secure system, but
also earning public trust and confidence in the strength of that system's security.
Another functionality issue is the immutability of blockchain records. Blockchain
technology can prevent alteration or deletion of transaction data after it has been
recorded.228 Immutability as a feature, however, is a double-edged sword. If accuracy
of the recorded data is assumed, the benefits of immutability include the creation of
a transparent and auditable record that indicates the status of each share at any
moment in time.229 But if a mistake is made in recorded data, immutability would
make it more difficult to correct.230 Development of a successful blockchain solution
must, therefore, account for the practical problems of immutability by minimizing
the possibility of erroneous records and establishing a protocol for remedying any
mistakes that occur.
224. Kelly & Mescall, supra note 18, at 242 (describing security risks in Overstock's
prospectus); Kelly & Mescall, supra note 161, at 152-54; see also Gaurav Yadav, The Collison
of Stock Exchanges and Blockchain, HACKERNOON (June 25, 2018), https://hackemoon.com
/the-collision-of-stock-exchanges-and-blockchain-55d222b87a8 [https://perma.cc/4DAV
-SDK5] (noting difficulty of maintaining security standards).
225. See Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REv. 505, 523 (2018).
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227. Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 21 (noting that hacks to Bitcoin exchanges have not
exposed weaknesses in the blockchain itself). Rather, certain features of the blockchain may
even offer enhanced security. For example, blockchains are decentralized, which means no
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a network of independent computers, making it more difficult for a cyberattack to overcome
the system.
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A final functionality concern is the scalability of blockchain technology for
widespread use in global capital markets. Blockchain does not present the same
physical limitations as the prior paper-based system. However, blockchain
technology is not currently capable of handling the daily transaction volume of
capital markets.2 3 1 A solution to this scalability challenge is necessary if blockchain
is to disrupt global capital markets and serve as the architecture underpinning stock
markets and exchanges.23 2 Otherwise, lack of scalability will restrict the benefit of
blockchain to some limited subset of stock issuances.
The above examples accentuate that development of a blockchain solution of
direct share ownership turns in large part on the resolution of practical questions
about how a blockchain system will operate. A blockchain-based system must show
that the technology will function reliably and improve upon the current indirect
holding system without introducing a new set of problems. Addressing these
functionality concerns, however, involves more than just ensuring that the
technology works effectively. It also requires establishing public trust in the
functionality of a blockchain-based system. The foregoing notwithstanding,
scalability presents an overarching functionality concern that may derail the
successful development and implementation of ablockchain system.233 A blockchain
system, therefore, must prove that it is capable of functioning as a platform for
securities exchanges and the backbone of global securities markets. Otherwise, the
benefit of applying blockchain to stock transactions is muted, which may result in
blockchain having a negligible impact on the future of stock transactions.
ii. Transition Issues
Replacing any incumbent system runs the risk of both anticipated and
unanticipated difficulties. Accordingly, transitioning from the current system to
blockchain may raise issues that slow or even prevent adoption of a blockchain
system.
One potential transition issue is the treatment of certificated securities in a
blockchain system. Corporate law continues to provide that shares of a corporation
shall be represented by a certificate.23 4 Although the board of directors may pass a
resolution to make some or all of a corporation's stock uncertificated,235 the practice
231. Id.; see also Elliott, supra note 161 (noting the need to figure out trading speed
challenges); Ryan Browne, Five Things That Must Happen for Blockchain to See Widespread
Adoption, According to Deloitte, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/01
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-LZZV] (noting work on improving transaction speed); Yadav, supra note 224 (noting
scalability problems with current projects); Bajpai, supra note 223 (discussing the need to
resolve scalability issues); Blockchain Revolutionizing Global Stock Trading, CIOREVIEW
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of issuing certificated shares of stock remains common. Since blockchain provides a
wholly digital mechanism for issuing and recording stock transactions, it may not
accommodate the stock that is represented by paper certificates. To the extent that a
blockchain system is inconsistent with paper stock certificates, transition to a wholly
blockchain-based system may necessitate abandonment of certificated securities-
those already issued and future issuances. Alternatively, a blockchain-based system
may not become ubiquitous, operating instead as an optional platform for
transactions involving uncertificated shares if corporations wish to continue issuing
certificated shares.
A second potential transition issue is whether moving records of existing stock
issuances onto blockchain is feasible. Adopting a blockchain system for new stock
issuances is comparatively straightforward. Since a blockchain ledger creates a
running record of all transactions,236 it is built to record the first issuance of a class
or series of stock and every transaction thereafter. Existing stock issuances, however,
present a possible complication. Blockchain was not used to record the first issuance
or subsequent transactions. Obtaining transaction data for all prior stock transactions
may not be possible-especially for long-issued stock in corporations with high
transaction volume. Even if all the records from prior transactions are available, the
accuracy of those records may be questionable. This effectively defeats some of the
most significant advantages of a blockchain stock ledger-specifically, the provision
of an accurate and auditable record of stock ownership. Ultimately, blockchain may
be better suited to new stock issuances as questions remain about the ability to
transition existing stock issuances onto blockchain.
Other transition issues could arise, but the above examples show how practical
problems with moving from the current system of indirect ownership and
intermediaries may adversely impact the adoption of a blockchain solution. The
inability to satisfactorily resolve transition issues would seemingly deter or even stop
adoption. Moreover, difficulties in transition, even if solvable, may ultimately
provide a preference for and retention of the incumbent system.
iii. Incumbency Advantage
A final challenge to the operationalization of blockchain technology in capital
markets is the need to generate a shift in mindset. The current system of share
immobilization, flawed as it is, enjoys the benefit of incumbency. Overcoming this
incumbency advantage may prove difficult.
For example, adoption of a blockchain solution requires a transfer of trust from
institutions to systems. But distaste for change and skepticism of new technology
may result in a preference for the status quo. Corporations and investors may prefer
the current system (with its known problems and legal risks) to the uncertainty of a
new blockchain system. That is, years of experience with the current indirect holding
system may have bred a level of comfort with both the system and the intermediaries
that make it work.




Skepticism of new technology and distaste for change aside, it is important to note
that moving to blockchain is also against the interest of many participants in the
current system.237 A blockchain system would facilitate a return to direct ownership
and holding of shares by the investors, eliminating the need for intermediaries such
as DTC (the world's largest central securities depositories).238 Intermediaries such as
DTC currently play an important role in facilitating stock transactions, but have no
place if blockchain replaces the indirect holding system. As such, there is little reason
for incumbents to embrace a change, even if blockchain improves upon the current
system.239 This lack of incentive for incumbents to support a solution that makes
them irrelevant together with a bias toward current systems is likely to present a
challenge for widespread adoption of a blockchain solution.
B. The Case for Proactive Amendment of Corporate Law
A future where global capital markets run on blockchain technology and
blockchain stock ledgers constitute the norm is far from certain. Reasons for
skepticism abound.240 A blockchain-based system may prove impracticable, or it
may never attain widespread adoption.241 Even so, this Article concludes that
policymakers should amend state corporate codes to expressly authorize corporations
to administer corporate records, including stock ledgers, on blockchain.
Why amend American corporate law to accommodate a future that may never
come to pass? Such action may seem premature as it runs the risk of expending time
and effort to pass needless legislation. But to the contrary, taking proactive action to
amend corporate codes is prudent for several reasons.
One is that amending state corporate codes to accommodate blockchain
technology aligns with the "enabling" philosophy underlying American corporate
law.24 2 American corporation statutes have long been characterized by freedom of
choice rather than dictates as to operation of the business. 243 As such, giving
corporations the ability to decide whether to use blockchain for administration of
corporate records is consistent with this tradition of corporate freedom and choice.
A second reason is that proactively seeking a solution to the problem provides the
time for a more meaningful exploration and assessment of a blockchain alternative.
The problems created by the current system of share immobilization have not reached
crisis level. Even so, a clear rationale exists for taking action to evaluate potential
solutions prior to the existence of a crisis. The absence of an emergency, such as the
threat of a stock exchange shutdown,24 4 allows for intentionality in development,
237. See Laster, supra note 179.
238. NASDAQ, Glossary of Stock Market Terms (Mar. 13, 2020),
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testing, and implementation. Moreover, it allows for any adoption of a new system
to occur organically. Amending corporate codes now eliminates legal risk and
uncertainty, which frees corporations to work toward blockchain exchanges and
stock ledgers.2 5 In contrast, neglecting to do so may hinder its development and
assessment, increasing the risk of haphazard consideration and implementation of a
blockchain system if it becomes necessary. Simply stated, the appropriate time to
evaluate potential alternatives is before a solution is compelled by the adverse effects
of the current system. Proactively amending corporate codes maximizes the
opportunity for full vetting of a blockchain solution. This, in turn, will mitigate the
potential risk of reactionary attempts to find a solution, including system issues,
transition problems, and other unforeseen consequences.
A third reason is that removal of roadblocks to modernization of corporate
recordkeeping (and more broadly, the infrastructure for effectuating stock
transactions) allows the market to decide the fate of blockchain in capital markets.
For the sake of clarity, this Article does not suggest hat corporate law should take a
stand on promoting a particular mechanism of recordkeeping or effectuating stock
transactions. Rather, it contends that corporate law should be indifferent. Amending
corporate law to allow corporations to opt into the use of blockchain technology does
exactly that by removing the legal risk that currently disadvantages a blockchain-
based system-freeing the market to decide whether it improves upon the current
system. Proactively amending corporate codes, therefore, prevents corporate law
from indirectly contributing to entrenchment of the incumbent system. Further,
electing not to accommodate blockchain may perpetuate stagnation in corporate
recordkeeping and the system of effectuation stock transactions. Even if blockchain
technology does not ultimately take hold, removing barriers to entry may spur action
from incumbents and efforts to improve the current system.2 46 Thus, amending
corporate law to authorize use of blockchain facilitates innovation, progress, and
exploration of new solutions.
Amending corporate law to grant corporations the freedom to opt into blockchain
stock ledgers brings many benefits. Chief among these is enabling corporate choice
and facilitating innovation. More specifically, amending now provides more time,
and with it, opportunity-to develop, explore, and assess various blockchain
applications (including blockchain-based stock ledgers, issuances, and exchanges).
Most importantly, it levels the playing field by remedying the preference that
corporate law currently creates for the incumbent system.24 7 This frees the market to
determine whether blockchain will fade away or become the new norm in global
capital markets. At minimum, the foregoing reasons justify serious consideration of
legislative action.
On the flip side, amending corporate law to accommodate blockchain carries little
downside. Simply allowing corporations to opt into the use of blockchain does not
force change. Corporations can continue to use existing methods of effectuating and
recording stock transactions. Moreover, the current system of share immobilization
remains intact, including intermediaries such as DTC. As such, the risk of harm from
245. See supra Section I.lA.1.
246. See Laster, supra note 179 (discussing incumbents).
247. See supra Section III.A.3.iii.
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wholesale replacement of an existing system is minimized. The downside then is
largely related to the expense of time and effort to enact legislation that may become
extraneous. As compared to the potential benefits, states seemingly have much to
gain and little to lose from amending corporate codes to accommodate blockchain.
If the above is not enough justification for states to amend their corporate code, a
final point is worth highlighting. States may also gain an advantage in the
competition for corporate charters by proactively amending corporate law to
accommodate blockchain.248 In short, the pursuit of blockchain-based systems to
disrupt traditional stock exchanges and markets continues both domestically and
abroad.24 9 If these efforts show promise or ultimately succeed, corporations may
choose (in part) to incorporate in jurisdictions that clearly authorize the use of
blockchain technology. Early adopters may see increased interest as a destination for
corporate organization, and states that do not act to accommodate blockchain may be
left behind. Self-interest aside, jurisdictions that have not done so would do well to
amend their corporate codes to give corporations the flexibility to opt into
blockchain-based administration of records.
The foregoing analysis also provides useful lessons for policymakers more
broadly grappling with the intersection of new applications of blockchain and
existing law. Blockchain has vast potential to disrupt traditional industries and the
legal frameworks that govern them.250 Policymakers, however, have the ability to
take a measured approach without neutering progress and innovation. Instead, they
can look to accommodate new applications of blockchain technology when there is
minimal risk of harm. In those situations, it is appropriate to modify existing law to
remove legal uncertainty around the use of new technology and ensure that the law
does not create an incumbency advantage (or otherwise contribute to entrenchment
of an incumbent system). By ensuring that the law is neutral, policymakers can allow
the market to freely decide the future of disruptive innovations and legacy systems.
This approach strikes a balance between accommodating progress, incentivizing
improvement, and preventing stagnation.
CONCLUSION
American corporate law should enable innovation and the modernization of
corporate recordkeeping. To that end, policymakers should support amending state
corporate codes to permit the use of blockchain technology. Just as the "paperwork
crisis" once brought the inadequacies of a paper-based system to the fore, recent
cases now raise legitimate concerns about the continuing efficacy of the federal
policy of share immobilization.
Blockchain may offer a technological solution-one that allows for reunification
of legal and beneficial stock ownership without the morass of paper-based
records. But finding out whether blockchain (or any other technological solution) can
in fact deliver on its potential requires an investment in the development and
248. See Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance and
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implementation of an alternative system, including an assessment of its viability and
scalability for widespread use by corporations and capital markets. Because most
states do not expressly authorize the use of blockchain technology for the
administration of corporate records, corporate law presently stands in the way of
progress. Absent express statutory authorization, corporate law provides a
disincentive to those who might otherwise explore alternatives to maintaining the
status quo. By amending corporate codes to expressly permit the use of blockchain,
states would remove a significant barrier to innovation in corporate recordkeeping.
To be clear, removing legal uncertainty does not assure success. Development of
a viable blockchain solution faces several challenges. But whether a blockchain
system supplants the current policy of share immobilization is wholly beside the
point. The eventual success of blockchain-based stock ledgers and stock transactions
has zero bearing on the conclusion that corporate law should permit the use of
distributed ledger technology. Putting the potential benefits and efficiency gains of
moving to blockchain aside, reasons abound for proactively amending corporate law
to authorize the use of a technology that has not yet (and may never) take hold.
Corporate law generally operates to enable and provide corporations with freedom
of choice. Corporate law, therefore, should not preempt he opportunity to pursue a
better system-blockchain based or otherwise. Instead, it should enable innovation
in recordkeeping and open the opportunity to pursue a blockchain solution. Absent
amendment, corporate law will support entrenchment of the incumbent system. With
a degree of insulation from competition, little incentive exists for incumbents to work
towards improving or remedying systemic problems of the current system. Corporate
law can level the playing field by giving corporations the choice to opt into the use
of blockchain technology. This allows the market to decide. Moreover, potential
competition from a new blockchain solution may also push incumbents to improve
the current system.
Expressly authorizing the use of blockchain also makes practical sense. While
serious, the problems created by the federal policy of share immobilization have not
risen to the level of the "paperwork crisis," which allows for development of a
blockchain solution to occur organically and intentionally. Amending corporate
codes at this juncture allows for both the space and time to truly evaluate blockchain-
based record keeping as an alternative. Simply put, it is prudent to consider potential
solutions before a replacement becomes necessary. A corollary benefit of early action
by states is the possibility of obtaining an advantage in the competition for charters.
So states have added incentive to amend.
Collectively, the case for proactive amendment outweighs the potential
downside-the possibility of expending time and energy to enact legislation that
ultimately proves unnecessary. Policymakers, therefore, have ample reason to amend
corporate law to authorize the use of blockchain, and now is the appropriate time to
do so.
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